

THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS & OUTBIDDING CYBERCRIMIMALS

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
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Throughout history, new technologies have revolutionized crime and warfare alike


- Chariot ..
- Gunpowder ..
- Tanks ..



Criminals proofed repeatedly to be very fast adopters of new technology



Thriving Underground Market




information about security vulnerabilities has become a valuable asset



Two decades of security investment ..

Vulnerabilities per month & 12 months moving average



The top ten vendors *IBM*, *Oracle*, *Cisco*, *Microsoft*, *Apple*, *RedHat*, *Google*, *Linux*, *Mozilla*, and *Adobe* account for more than 33 percent of all vulnerabilities published in the last 12 months.



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
Trend: five years vs. last year

#	VENDOR	HISTORY 20Y	TREND 60M	VULNS AVG 60M	VULNS LAST 12M	RISK LAST 12M
1	IBM		+103%	215	437	high med low
2	Oracle	and the	+48%	291	431	high med low
3	Cisco	All and a second second	+94%	198	385	high med low
4	Microsoft	الملتطليلين	+33%	267	356	high med low
5	Apple	لللعو	+5%	255	267	high med low
6	RedHat	- Henry	+152%	62	156	high med low
7	Google		-19%	192	155	high med low
8	Linux	which	+7%	123	131	high med low
9	Mozilla	بالسيلان.	-19%	149	121	high med low
10	Adobe		-28%	159	115	high med low

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Trend: five years vs. last year





Software Industry

- The top ten vendors quite well represent the software industry
- These represent >80% market share of OSes, browsers, databases, plug-ins, .. in daily use
- They employ the best software engineers and have lots of funds
- After two decades, vulnerabilities do not go away



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
Vulnerabilities known only to privileged closed groups such as ..



.. pose a real and present risk to all who use the affected software




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Lifecycle of a Vulnerability



The Known Unknowns vulnerabilities known to privileged groups only

How many? Unknown for how long? How to measure?




Vulnerability Purchase Programs

Data of two vulnerability purchase programs covering 1,855 vulnerabilities from 2002 - 2013 allow the reconstruction of the vulnerability lifecycle after publication

Program	Program	Total	Targeted	Time To	
	Inception	Purchases	Vendors	Disclosure	Pre-disclosure
iDefense VCP	2002	969	195	133 days	risk
TippingPoint ZDI	2005	1,423	92	174 days	

These programs coordinate vulnerability information with the software vendor!





Relevant targets, considerable exposure

	Vendor	Το	tal Purc	hases	Days	Vendor	
#	Affected	VCP	ZDI	VCP+ZDI	Private	Share	
1	Microsoft	153	237	390	181	14%	
2	Apple	38	171	209	129	10%	14%
3	HP	17	157	174	233	19%	of all Microsoft
4	Adobe	59	102	161	119	17%	
5	Oracle	29	114	143	166	8%	vulnerabilities
6	Novell	30	112	142	142	10%	reported through a
7	IBM	58	67	125	226	8%	purchase program
8	RealNetworks	19	73	92	262	49%	
9	Sun	34	26	60	159	5%	
10	Symantec	20	39	59	198	18%	
11	Mozilla	8	51	59	80	5%	
12	CA	23	30	53	151	29%	
13	EMC	11	35	46	131	38%	
14	Cisco	10	20	30	229	2%	
15	WebKit	13	14	27	138	5%	153 days
16	Trend Micro	15	10	25	94	24%	roo days
17	Samba	9	14	23	65	28%	from purchase to
18	lpswitch	15	8	23	58	25%	
19	SAP	4	10	14	143	13%	patch availability
Total		565	1290	1855			
Averag	ge				153	17%	



Purchase programs ...


- cover a considerable share of a vendors' vulnerabilities
- despite offering low prices compared to the "black market"

Exposure to "Known Unknowns"

How many yet unpublished vulnerabilities are known to purchase programs exclusively ..


at any given day in the last years?






of known unknowns, average per day







VCP & ZDI inform the vendor in order to release a patch



Critical vulnerabilities are available

in considerable quantities for private groups, for extended periods

and for a relatively low price



When the vendor is not informed about new vulnerabilities

average zero-day attack persists 312 days

The average zero-day attack persists for almost a year before it is detected

Source: Symantec Research http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/zero-day-world





More Unknowns

Our measurement provides a minimum estimate of the known unknowns

(... criminals and government agencies don't share data)

What about vulnerabilities and exploits that are not publicly traded, and are definitively not coordinated with the software vendor?

- Boutique Exploit Providers
- Governments & Defense Contractors
- Commercial Security Consulting







Vulnerability & Exploit Providers


An increasing number of commercial players offer zero-day exploits for their subscribers:

- they do not reveal their clients (big buyers reportedly include government agencies)
- have a keen interest in a long pre-disclosure time (keep the zero-day private as long as possible)
- some firms restrict their clientele (by country, specific agencies)
- price for exploits between USD \$40k and \$160k



Shopping List

Maui – Zero-Day Vulnerabi	ility and CNE/CNA Program	
Maui USD \$2.5 million for 25 zero-day exploits per year	\$2,500,000 per contract year	 Minimum of 25 deliverables per year Deliverable contents - Software Software CNE/CNA Metasploit module VMware image for testing Deliverable contents - Documentation Vulnerability information CNE/CNA information Demo instructions Revision history



.. for use by trained and untrained operators



Challenge to Society

Our security depends largely on ethical researchers reporting vulnerabilities under the practices of coordinated disclosure for free

At the same time, the black market is expanding rapidly and offering large rewards for the same information



"Never was so much owed by so many to so few."

Winston Churchill's famous 1940 wartime speech



Cyber Crime Losses

Yearly losses due to cyber crime are estimated between

10 to 1,000 billion USD

Vulnerabilities are the root cause of considerable part of these losses



What if ...

.. we would purchase all vulnerabilities and report them to the vendor for remediation?

for USD **150,000.**per vulnerability

with a massive bug bounty program?



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Reasoning

USD 150,000.per vulnerability

- doing nothing is not an option for the future
- we would outbid most cyber criminals
- increase research > more robust products
- validate the economics by buying all vulnerabilities regardless of criticality



We can outbid criminals

Buying vulnerabilities makes sense as long as the purchase cost is less than the cost of the prevented losses



Vulnerability abuse incurs large collateral damage, exceeding criminals revenue



International Vulnerability Purchase Program

What would it cost society to buy all vulnerabilities from all vendors for USD 150,000 each?

This includes buying all non-critical vulnerabilites

		Cost in Million \$				Pe	rcentage Co	Percentage Cost of		
	Vuln.	Co	ost by Ri	sk		GDP	GDP	Revenue	Cyber Crin	ne Estimates
Vendors	Total	High	Med	Low	Total	US	EU	SW Ind.	10 Billion	100 Billion
All	5,218	265	441	76	783	0.005%	0.005%	0.268%	7.827%	0.783%
Top 100	3,332	192	257	51	500	0.003%	0.003%	0.171%	4.998%	0.500%
Top 50	2,959	176	224	44	404	0.003%	0.003%	0.152%	4.439%	0.444%
Top 10	2,065	147	134	29	310	0.002%	0.002%	0.106%	3.098%	0.310%
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		0.0	1%						19	6
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Cost of buying all vulnerabilities in 2012

US or the European



Software vendors buying their vulnerabilities

What would it cost software vendors to buy all their vulnerabilities for USD 150,000 each?

Cost of buying vendor vulnerabilities in 2012

		Cost in				Revenue in Million \$		
	Vuln.	Cost by Risk		k				
Vendor	Total	High	Med	Low	Total	Revenue	Cost in %	
Oracle	427	9.8	37.4	17.0	64.1	37,120	0.173%	
Apple	303	25.1	18.3	2.1	45.5	164,700	0.028%	
Google	279	24.9	16.2	0.8	41.9	49,770	0.084%	less than
Mozilla	202	18.0	11.6	0.8	30.3	n/a		1%
IBM	175	6.9	16.5	2.9	26.3	104,500	0.025%	170
Microsoft	173	18.2	7.2	0.6	26.0	72,930	0.036%	of the software
Cisco	160	13.8	9.5	0.8	24.0	46,680	0.051%	vendors' revenue
Adobe	146	19.8	2.1	0.0	21.9	4,404	0.497%	
Linux	116	3.5	10.5	3.5	17.4	n/a		
HP	84	6.8	5.0	0.9	12.6	120,400	0.010%	
Total w/o Mozilla, Linux	(Open So	ource, No	Revenue)		262.1	600,504.0	0.044%	

This includes buying all non-critical vulnerabilites



Follow the money ...

The experience of past decades has shown that traditional approaches based on "more of the same" can not deliver adequate security

The question to ask is this:

"How much are those that bear the costs willing to pay to reduce their losses incurred as a result of cyber crime?"

Online Cost Callculat http://www.techzoom.net/BugBounty/EconomicsGlobal



Run your price model ...

Check out the online calcluator to test your price model

- You chose price per criticality
- Calculates total cost for Top-N or all vendors
- Up-to date data from past 12 months

http://www.techzoom.net/BugBounty/EconomicsGlobal



Challenge to Society

Our security depends largely on ethical researchers reporting vulnerabilities under the practices of coordinated disclosure for free

At the same time, the black market is expanding rapidly and offering large rewards for the same information

This trend is not sustainable

Conclusion Recommendations



Conclusion

The software industry is yet unable to produce secure code.

Vulnerabilities and exploits continue to be available for abuse, for extended periods and unknown to the public.



Conclusion

We depend on researchers following coordinated disclosure for free, while the black market offers top money,

this current approach is not sustainable

It makes economic sense to purchase vulnerabilities, and we can outbid cyber criminals



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Conclusion

What is the cost of doing nothing?



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REFERENCES





References

- The Known Unknowns in Cyber Security <u>http://www.techzoom.net/Publications/Papers/knownunknowns</u>
- International Vulnerability Purchase Program (IVPP) <u>http://www.techzoom.net/Publications/Papers/ivpp</u>
- Correlation of Detection Failures
 <u>http://www.techzoom.net/Publications/Papers/failurecorrelation</u>